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Voter migration is a significant factor in the geographic sorting
of the American electorate
Almost any electoral map of the United States clearly shows an association between political
beliefs and geography; states in the South and Midwest tend to vote Republican, while the West
Coast and Northeast reliably lean Democratic. Following this, Wendy K. Tam Cho looks for
evidence of political self-segregation—that is, individuals moving to areas that contain clusters of
other like-minded people—by tracking movement using voter records from 2004, 2006, and 2008.
Her results indicate that, while it may not be the only factor, partisan sorting is a significant
component of destination decisions.
News outlets in the United States seem to have adopted a uniform color scheme in maps for depicting Republican
and Democratic support. When we view presidential election returns, we expect to see red and blue states, with
red states signaling Republican support and blue states highlighting areas of Democratic strength. These maps
succinctly convey a lot of information, and even those who are not particularly in tune with politics are struck by
the plainly non-random displays of red and blue in U.S. elections. In particular, red states cover most of the
landmass in the United States, while blue areas dominate the most densely populated regions. A view of these
maps across time would further show that these patterns appear to be intensifying over time. Election after
election, barring startling scandals, Democratic and Republican strongholds bear true to our pre-election
expectations that their voters adhere to past partisan loyalties.
In 2008, despite Barack Obama’s
lopsided presidential election
victory in many parts of the
country, the geographic
expression of rival partisan
preferences appears to have
heightened over previous
elections.
The counties that previously
favored one party awarded even
greater victory margins to their
preferred party, and the
distribution of party registrants
became increasingly askew
across more locations. In the
United States, Republicans prefer
to live in close proximity to other
Republicans, just as Democrats
prefer their own kind.
This pattern of geographic
clustering is intriguing, to be sure,
but some have also claimed that it is alarming. Bill Bishop has lamented that geographic clustering of like-minded
individuals breeds narrowness of viewpoint. He argues that heterogeneous communities teach their members to
compromise by providing a neighborly forum for opposing opinions, whereas homogeneous communities promote
extremism and ideological intensity because differing viewpoints are regularly dismissed without discussion or
consideration. If we continue on this present course, Bishop admonishes, this cultural evolution will foster an
increasingly intense intolerance that will tear the country apart at its seams.
The consequences of geographic clustering may also manifest at the institutional level where this type of
geographic patterning may foster less responsive representatives. After all, why would politicians spend time
courting constituents in noncompetitive homogeneous communities? Ironically, constituents reward, rather than
penalize like-minded representatives because they place a higher premium on ideology than on responsiveness.
The result, one might bewail, is a polity wherein citizens are deeply divided, parties are polarized, and political
discourse is stifled.
We can speculate but we cannot know the precise future implications of geographic sorting. Although some might
consider the Bishop account to be sensationalized, it is also believable enough to cause one to take pause. Is our
preference to live among and associate with like-minded individuals likely to result in a country that none of us
prefer—a country characterized by intolerance and dismissiveness?
In our research, we do not take a position on the political consequences of the geographic sorting of the
electorate, but we acknowledge that consequences exist and that they have implications for democratic practices
and traditions. The aggregate patterns of partisanship are clear when it comes to presidential preference. We are
diffident about the consequences because we are unsure of the roots of the phenomenon. What creates, defines,
and sustains these geographic patters of partisanship that shape the behavior of individuals as well as politicians?
Bishop offers evidence that the American electorate has been sorting itself through decades of internal migration.
His primary evidence comes from presidential voting data at the county level. Over three decades, he showed that
counties that voted for the Democratic candidate have produced even more solid Democratic support, and
Republican counties have become more reliably Republican. The maps, although remarkable in this regard, fall
short of definitive as he presents aggregate patterning that is incapable of reliably shedding light on individual
behavior. County-level relationships may be suggestive, but we have long known that their relationship with
individual-level tendencies might not be in the same direction or of comparable magnitude. To obtain information
about individual behavior, we must examine individual-level data.
We empirically examine individual voter migration on a large scale. Surely, many factors contribute to geographic
variation in the balance of partisanship. Population migration is one obvious force, but other factors, such as the
polarization of the national parties and the evolution of individual attitudes, would have a similar effect. There is
much research that remains to understand the phenomena, and our contribution is in an empirical examination of
voter migration.
To understand the effects of migration on the political landscape, we identify and track migration flows through
voter files from 2004, 2006, and 2008 across seven states. For evidence that geographic sorting is occurring, we
should see indications that Republicans move to areas that are more favorable to Republicans than their original
locale. Similarly, Democrats should migrate toward areas that are more favorable to Democrats.
It was evident in our analysis that not all partisans exhibit the same tendency to sort geographically. Partisan
preference is regularly trumped by economic concerns. As one might expect, destination decisions are strongly
related to destination characteristics related to racial composition, income, and population density. At the same
time, our research indicates that partisan sorting is statistically significant for both Republicans and Democrats
even after a whole host of neighborhood characteristics have been taken into account.
Certainly, migration is never only about politics or even principally about it. We hypothesized and our analysis
contained evidence that jobs and family concerns remain the most important factors in migration decisions.
Nonetheless, once the major decisions about relocation have been made—that a move is going to occur, that it
will be to this state, to that metro area, and to this county—then the more micro decisions are made about specific
neighborhoods, streets, and dwellings. At this level, the remaining political locales often still sport a significant
amount of partisan variation. It is at this point that considerations might be more proximate to political values and
where partisanship might play a more prominent role in the decision process. Whether the role of partisanship is
central or ancillary, if it is any part of the decision process, it has the potential to recast the political landscape of
the United States.
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